

# Security Mechanism for Mobile IP

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**Abstract:** With the evolution in the processing capabilities of wireless devices such as Smart Phones and laptops, a steady internet connection is hugely in demand. This demand is raised by the introduction of internet connectivity within the airplanes. Mobile IP is one of the protocols that have been propositioned to support user/network mobility. Mobile IP turns us on to new entities such as Home Agent and Foreign Agent to facilitate user/network mobility. As the user/network (mobile client) move from one network to another all their connections need to be handed off from one mobile agent to another to maintain unified connectivity. Effective handoff mechanism by itself is an active research discipline and security conjoined with effective handoff pioneers new challenges.

While these security mechanisms help in upholding security and privacy of the user, they introduce superfluous processing delay thereby affecting the performance. In this paper, the authors insinuate a novel low cost security mechanism that ensures the security of the communication. It will be publicized that the proposed mechanism will secure mobile node communication without distressing the performance. While the proposed architecture necessitates the mobility agents to cache bonus information, the analysis carried out by the author's flashes that the additional cost is compensated by the added security for the communication between the mobile client and the mobility agents.

**Key words:** Mobile IP, Issus, Handover, IP Protocol and mobility for MIP.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Access to internet has stretched a long expanse, from mere luxury to a necessity. Users expect access to the information openly offered on the internet irrespective of their current status i.e. stationary or mobile. Mobility support has become a stipulation to cater the needs of mobile internet users. Tagging mobility support to current internet infrastructure opens up a whole new set of concerns, privacy, data security, and performance to name a few.

Delivering the data to the mobile user's current location without conceding the privacy is one of the biggest trials faced by the amenity benefactors. As it has been ascertained in several of earlier research efforts, security and performance together do not work well. Performance [5] is affected negatively if an effort is made to secure the provided connection. Many researchers have tried to reach equilibrium amid security and performance while not compromising on the privacy of the mobile users. Most of such efforts revolve about using public key cryptography and pre-registration of the mobile clients.

Adjacent to security, movement between different networks also affects the performance of mobile clients.

When a mobile client moves from one network to another, the underlying infrastructure needs to move all the corresponding connections (connections established by the mobile client to the internet) to the new-fangled location. Current internet infrastructure does not support this kind of transfer inherently. This calls for patches, like Mobile IP, that are developed to support user mobility within TCP/IP protocol stack. Mobile IP [2] defines mobility support agents like Home Agent (HA) and Foreign Agent (FA) that are located in the home network and foreign network correspondingly. The HA is accountable for protecting the privacy of the mobile client. The HA intercepts all communication towards the mobile client (when mobile client is away) and securely forwards it to the mobile clients new location. The FA (of a specific network) is responsible for providing internet access to the mobile client when the remnants are visiting a foreign network. Working with HA and FA, the mobile IP protocol ensures that the current location of the mobile client is mystified from rest of the internet.

When the mobile client moves from one network to another, it has to go through a registration route. This ensures that the HA is aware of the current location of the mobile client and also allows the HA to build a secure connection between itself and the mobile client's current location. One of the significant issues with the current approaches is the registration lull [1]. Most of the current proposals suggest the mobile client to initiate the registration process after it has detected that it is in the range of a new foreign network. Depending upon the number of extensions (like security, QoS requirements etc), the time required to complete the registration process will also boost. This will adversely affect the performance of the mobile clients when they are roaming.

An alternative foremost issue is security. Most of the current proposals require the authority of a third caucus device to distribute the security keys [6]. This yet again delays the process and leaves room for security breaches.

With Traditional Security mechanisms such as IPSec, there will be an increase in the delay and reduction in the throughput [6]. Also the key negotiation and generation as required by IKE imposes a significant penalty to the throughput. One of the workarounds to address such issues is the use of key exchange servers at the home network and foreign network [1]. Exchange of keys with mobile node as well as foreign agent and home agent is allowed by the use of servers. With this solution, there is a fall in the delay but the throughput does not depreciate visibly. Also, few security concerns ascend as the key exchange server is

sometimes compromised and would lead to a single point of failure. Another proposal, based on the public key cryptography [6], tries to address some of these disquiets. In this scheme, the mobility agents exchange their public keys to increase security. This reduces the security risks, but the throughput alarms still remain.

Also, the delay in the key exchange process adds to the registration delay, further affecting the performance.

In this paper, the instigators endeavor to address some of these apprehensions. The authors advocate using public key encryption scheme for communication amid the mobile client and the FA. The public key exercised by the FA will be supplied by the HA during the pre-registration progression. This will warrant a well-timed and sheltered registration process. In the ensuing section, the authors confer the working of Mobile IP, which is the current mobility support protocol.

## II. MOBILE IP

Mobile IP [3] is one of the first protocols developed to support user mobility. Mobile IP was designed around the tunneling principle. With the help of mobility agents (HA and FA) the protocol tunneled the datagrams destined to the mobile client to its current location. Standardized by IETF (Internet Engineering task force), mobile IP, enables a node to change its point of attachment to the internet in a manner transparent to applications running on top of the protocol stack.

Working of Mobile IP is described as below:

- When in home network, the mobile client is registered with the HA and actively participates in network operations

- When the mobile client recognizes the movement from home network to a foreign network (either through agent advertisements or timeouts), it attempts get associated with the FA of the new network.

- After layer 2 handoff (physical layer association) is complete, the mobile client generates a registration request and forwards it to the FA. The registration request will have information about the HA that will be providing mobility support to the mobile client when the client is away. The registration request will also have the care-of-address (COA) that is supplied by the FA in agent advertisements[8]. The COA acts as the current address of the mobile client when it is in the foreign domain.


- FA re-encapsulates packet with its own address and sends it towards the HA.

- HA will perform security checks (registration request will also have a shared secret key that is common between HA and mobile client) and once the authenticity of the mobile client is established, the HA will generate a registration reply. In addition, the HA inserts a route in its routing table for the mobile client that is pointing to the COA embedded in the registration request [9].

- Then, the HA initiates a bidirectional tunnel between itself and the FA. FA acknowledges and a secure communication path is established between the HA and FA to transport packets sourced from and destined to the mobile client.

One of the major issues with the mobile IP approach is the security. Mobile IP does not define any specific security mechanism between the FA and the mobile client. Hence it is possible that a rogue FA could offer services to the mobile client and could disrupt communication. Another downside of the Mobile IP is the handoff mechanism.

Handoff process defined by the mobile IP protocol introduces latency and packet loss that are not desired for delay sensitive and real time applications. This can be reduced using pre-registration schemes.



Fig(1) Algorithm for proposed Scheme

In the pre-registration scheme, external entities like wireless sensor networks (WSN) [7] or GPS are used to track the movement of the mobile client. When the external entity detects the movement, it informs the corresponding mobility agents i.e. HA, oFA and nFA (oFA is the FA of the network where the client is currently attached and nFA is the FA of the network where the mobile client is moving into). The nFA generates a preregistration request and forwards it to the HA. With the assumption that the node will move into the foreign network, the HA authenticates the mobile node and starts forwarding traffic to both FAs until the oFA terminates the connection. In this paper, the authors have considered the use of WSN for movement detection.

In the next Section, the authors describe the working of the proposed protocol.

## III. PROPOSED SCHEME

In order to address the security issues involved with the mobility support, in the current paper, the authors propose using public key encryption mechanism.

The working of the proposed scheme is outlined in Figure 1. The proposed scheme has two stages i.e. key exchange and communication establishment.

### A. Key exchange mechanism:

Similar to some of the other proposals, in the current work, the authors propose using public key encryption to secure communication between the mobile client and the FA. However, unlike other proposals, the keys are generated by the mobile client and is deposited at the HA for distribution. This will aid in bidirectional authentication and secure communication. Details of the key exchange mechanism are outlined below:

### B. Key generation:

When mobile client is in home network, it generates a private key and sends it to the HA. The HA, using the private key sent by the mobile client, generates a set of public keys. This process could be done at the HA itself or the HA can use the services of a key server for generating the public keys. Once the public keys are generated, the HA sends an acknowledgement message to the mobile client confirming the generation of public keys.

Once the mobile client passes through "n" foreign networks, it generates a new private key and sends it towards the HA. The number of foreign networks the mobile client needs to pass through before new key is generated depends upon the individual network administrators. This procedure will ensure that the security of the mobile client communication is not compromised at any point.

### C. Key distribution:

When the mobile client away from the HA, HA initializes the mobility support services for the corresponding mobile client. Once the underlying WSN provides the details of mobile client movement and information about the new foreign network the mobile client is about to move into, the HA anticipates a pre-registration request from the nFA. When the nFA obtains the movement information from the WSN, it generates a pre-registration request and sends it towards the HA. The HA, after confirming the identity of the nFA, sends a pre-registration reply message that contains details of the mobile client along with a public key that the nFA can use to communicate with the mobile client. nFA saves this information in its cache and waits for the mobile client to get associated with the foreign network. One of the assumptions made here is that HA and nFA already have a security association between them and the communication between them is secure. If this is not the case, then the HA and FA can use the mobile IP extensions for security between HA and FA to establish a secure channel between them.

### D. Communication establishment:

One of the main differences between the traditional mobile IP extensions and the proposed protocols is in terms of the communication establishment procedure. In the legacy proposals, the security between FA and mobile client is established after the registration process is complete (or in some cases there is no defined security mechanism between FA and mobile client). In the proposed architecture, the security mechanism is established even before the mobile client gets associated with the FA. This helps FA in authenticating the mobile client as well as helps the mobile client in establishing a secure channel with the FA as soon as layer 2 handoff is completed. The proposed architecture also helps the mobile node in maintaining better performance as the delay involved with handoff process will be lower than many of the legacy proposals.

The working of the proposed architecture is explained below with two possible scenarios i.e. mobile client moving from the home network to a foreign network and mobile client moving from one foreign network to another.

- **Scenario 1:** Consider the network shown in Figure 2. The mobile client is currently in the home network and

is moving from the home network to a foreign network (FA1 and FA2).

- When registered with the HA, the mobile client generates a private key and shares it with the HA
- HA forwards the private key to the key exchange server (only if the HA is not capable of generating the public keys) to generate the corresponding public keys
- The key exchange server, upon receiving the private key from the HA, generates corresponding public keys and sends it back to the HA
- The HA then sends an ACK packet back to the mobile client indicating that the subset of keys is successful.
- Upon receiving the ACK packet, the mobile client stores the private key in its database
- As soon as mobile client starts moving towards FA1, sensor networks (SN1) detects it and informs both the FA1 and the HA
- FA1 triggers the pre-handoff process by enquiring HA about the mobile client characteristics
- HA sends the information to FA1 which contains the key as well
- The FA1 sends an ACK packet to the HA indicating that it has received all the required information. In addition, the ACK packet contains the COA that would be associated with the mobile client
- When mobile client arrives in the FA1, FA1 sends a solicit message which contains the negotiation packet. The packet is encrypted with the key provided by the HA
- If the mobile client is able to decrypt the packet, it would then send an ACK packet to the FA1 and negotiate the encryption algorithm
- If FA1 does not receive the ACK packet, it confirms the user is not legitimate and informs the same to HA.


- **Scenario 2:** Consider the network shown in Figure 2. The mobile client is currently associated with FA1 and is moving towards FA2.

- As soon as the mobile client starts moving towards FA2, sensor networks (SN2) detects it and informs HA, FA1, and FA2
- FA2 triggers the pre-handoff process by enquiring HA about the mobile client characteristics
- HA sends the necessary information to the FA2 which contains a new key that FA2 can use to communicate with mobile client
- FA2 then sends an ACK packet to the HA, indicating that it has received all the required information. This ACK packet contains the COA that would be associated with the mobile client
- HA creates a simultaneous binding for the mobile client. Packets intercepted by the HA will be tunneled to both the foreign networks and as a result there might be duplicate packets for a short duration.

Fig (2) Network proposed scheme FA1-FA2

- When the mobile client arrives in the range of FA2, FA2 sends a solicit message which contains the negotiation packet. The packet is encrypted using the key given by the HA
- If mobile client is successfully able to decrypt the packet, it would then send an ACK packet to the FA1 and negotiate the encryption algorithm.

- Mobile client sends a registration request packet to the FA and FA will send a registration reply on behalf of HA. Soon after it receives the registration reply, the mobile client forces a layer 2 handoff
- FA2 then forwards a message to the FA1 to delete the association details for mobile client



IV. ANALYSIS

1. Handoff cost for traditional Mobile IP:

As described in the RFC 3344 [2], the movement detection in traditional mobile IP occurs when the lifetime expires or by using prefixes. The life time is the amount of time elapsed since the last agent advertisement was heard? So once the lifetime expires, the mobile client thinks that it has moved to another foreign network and starts the handoff process.

When using the prefix extensions every mobility agent needs to add prefix elements in their advertisements. As soon as the mobile node receives a prefix other than the one it is currently associated to, the mobile client assumes that it has moved to another network and initiates the handoff process. One of the major disadvantages of this approach is the additional overhead of prefixes that every FA needs to include in the agent advertisements.

Consider lifetime expiration based handoff mechanism.

When the lifetime of the previous agent advertisement expires, if the mobile client did not receive new advertisement from the previous FA (oFA), the mobile client assumes that it has moved away from the oFA.

Considering the worst case scenario where the mobile client heard an agent advertisement just before it went out of the range of the oFA, the time required to detect the movement would be T lifetime. After it knows it has moved, the mobile client attempts to force a layer 2 handoff to the new FA (nFA). Since, in traditional Mobile IP, a mobile client cannot associate itself with two mobility agents simultaneously, it will have to break the connection (layer 2) with the oFA before getting associated with the nFA.

Once the mobile client disassociates itself with the oFA, it will try to register itself with the nFA from which it had received advertisements. Let the delay involved in disassociating the mobile client from the oFA and associating with nFA (at layer 2) be TL2. If the mobile client has not heard any new agent advertisements, then it will try

to discover an agent by performing agent solicitation. Let the time taken by this process be TDiscovery.

Once the layer 2 handoff is done the mobile client will send a registration request packet to the nFA in order to register itself with the HA. Let the time taken be T(MN-FA).

The packet is then forwarded to the HA by the FA. Let the time taken be T(FA-HA). HA sends a registration reply to the FA. Let this time taken be T(HA-FA). The packet is forwarded to the MN. Let it be T(FA-MN). Hence, the total time taken by the traditional Mobile IP to perform a handoff would be

$$T_{Handoff} = T_{lifetime} + T_{L2} + T_{Discovery} + T(MN-FA) + T(FA-HA) + T(HA-FA) + T(FA-MN) \quad (1)$$




Fig (3) Timing during handoff for the Traditional Mobile IP

During the handoff time, as there is no communication between the mobile client and the HA, all the packets destined to the mobile client are lost. Hence the THandoff would be the total time during which packets are lost.

2. Handoff cost while using the wireless sensor network [8]:

In the scheme proposed by Bahety et al, by using the wireless sensor networks, the handoff cost is significantly reduced. The Figure 4 shows the timing diagram of the proposed mechanism by Bahety et al.




Fig (4) Timing during handoff by using WSN

In this method, the wireless sensors which are present at the edge of the network perform movement detection. As described earlier, this method uses the STUN architecture to detect the movement of the mobile client and inform the mobility agents regarding the same. The wireless sensors can be installed in such a way that the L3 handoff process completes before L2 handoff takes place (with the assumption that the wireless cells do not overlap). Let  $X$  be a certain non-zero time taken by the wireless sensor network to detect that mobile client is moving in a particular direction. The WSN then informs the FA about the detection of the movement of the mobile client. Let this time be TWS-FA. At this point the FA sends a cached agent advertisement to the mobile client that begins the registration process. Let the time taken be TPre-registration.

During the cached registration process the oFA would solicit on behalf of the nFA. As soon as the MN receives this new agent advertisement, it will assume that it has moved to an nFA. The MN sends registration request to the FA which is then forwarded to HA. Let the time taken be TMN-FA and TFA-HA respectively. The nFA receives a registration reply from the HA and forwards it to the MN.

Let the time taken be THA-FA and TFA-MN respectively. As soon as mobile client receives the registration reply, it tries to force a layer 2 handoff. Since, during the L3 handoff process, the mobile client will keep receiving the packets from oFA, the total handoff delay would be  $T(WS)Handoff = TL2$ .

Here  $T(WS)Handoff$  is the total handoff latency using the WSN during which the packets would get lost. Also an optimum distance at which WSN should be installed is calculated.

The total time taken for movement detection and L3 handoff is

$$T_{Detection} = T_{MN-FA} + T_{FA-HA} + T_{WS-FA} + T_{HA-FA} + T_{FA-MN} \quad (2)$$

**3. Handoff mechanism using AAAF server:** The above discussed approaches do not consider security parameters.

Many research efforts have indicated that traditional IPsec based encryption is not well suited for mobility environment due to performance impact as well as security concerns (shared secret does not provide security over long term). As discussed earlier, one of the workarounds was to use AAA server based security mechanism. In the AAA server based proposal, it is assumed that every network consists of a AAA server. It is also assumed that the AAA servers can communicate with each other and the communication channel established between the AAA servers is secure. In Figure 5 [4], the authors outline the timing sequence of AAA server based secure handoff mechanism for mobility support.




Fig (5) Timing during handoff for the scheme using AAA Servers

When the mobile client is in HA, it will obtain authentication from the AAAHome. When the mobile client moves from HA to the foreign network, the AAAHome establishes communication with the AAAForeign and provides information about the mobile client (security details). AAAHome generates a temporary security key that can be used for communication between AAAForeign and mobile client. The AAA servers generate and distribute these security keys between the mobile client and the mobility agents till the keys expire. When the mobile client moves into a foreign network, it will attempt to contact the local AAA server for authentication. Let the time taken to complete this authentication process be TAAAF-MN.

AAAHome distributes the session key  $K(MN-HA)$  between the HA and the mobile client. Let the time taken for this process be  $T(AAAF-HA)$ . AAAForeign distributes the security keys  $K(MN-FA)$  between mobile client and FA. AAAForeign also distributes  $K(FA-HA)$  between the HA and FA. If oFA and nFA belong to the same domain and controlled by one AAA server, then there exists only one security association. Let the time taken to communicate between AAA server and nFA be  $T(AAAF-NFA)$ . Similarly, the time taken to establish communication between AAAForeign and oFA be  $T(AAAF-OFA)$ . MN then registers with the nFA (through the oFA) and the registration request and the registration reply are routed through the oFA. Hence the total handoff time would be  $T(Handoff) = T(AAAF-MN) + K(MN-HA) + T(AAAF-HA) + K(MN-FA) + K(FA-HA) + T(AAAF-NFA) + T(AAAF-OFA)$ . (3)

When the mobile client moves between networks controlled by different AAA servers, then additional delay is introduced as the AAAHome server needs to communicate with multiple AAA servers each controlling different foreign domains.

**4. Handoff mechanism using proposed architecture:**

As discussed earlier, by using the wireless sensor networks the handoff delay can be reduced. Also, it was observed that, using the AAA server, it is possible to secure the communication between the mobile client and the mobility agents. However, as described in the earlier section, AAA server based approach adds additional delay while distributing the security keys. Also, it does not address these security risks completely as the communication between the AAA servers is also prone to security attacks.

Figure 6 shows the timing diagram of the proposed scheme during handoff of mobile client between the home network and the foreign network. Figure 7 shows the timing diagram when the mobile client moves from one foreign network to another.




Fig (6) Timing during handoff for the proposed scheme (mobile client is moving from HA to FA)

When the network starts up mobile client is in home network. Mobile client sends a packet to the HA containing the private key mobile client will be using to decrypt the packets from mobility agents. The HA then forwards the packet to the key exchange server. The key exchange server generates a key (or it could be done at the HA itself) which is forwarded to HA. HA acknowledges the key to the mobile client and stores the public keys of the mobile client in its cache. Let the time taken to generate the keys be TK. As the mobile client moves towards FA1, sensor networks detect the movement. Let this time be Td. The sensor networks report mobile client's movement to both the HA and the FA. Let the time taken be Ti. Now the FA requests information about mobile client from HA. Consider this time to be T(Fi-Hi). The HA replies to the FA about the mobile client and the keys associated with it. Let the time taken here be T(Hi-Fi). The FA acknowledges to the HA about registration of the mobile client and the associated CoA. Let the time taken be T(FA1-HA1). As the mobile client moves into the foreign network, it requests registration with the FA. Consider the time taken to transmit the registration request be T(MN-FA).

The FA sends a packet to the mobile client with its public key and the CoA. The mobile client decrypts the

packet with its private key and extracts the CoA and the public key of the FA. Let the time taken for this be T(FA-MN) + T(MN-FA). The HA intercepts all the packets destined to the mobile client and delivers them to the destination via the FA. If the mobile client is unable to decrypt the packet sent by the FA, then it will not be able to complete the registration process.




Fig (7) Timing during handoff for the proposed scheme (mobile client is moving from FA1 to FA2)

When the mobile client moves between foreign networks (FA1 to FA2), the WSN detects the movement. Let the time taken be Td1. The sensor network reports the movement to the mobility agents i.e. HA, FA1, and FA2. Let the time taken be Ti1. The FA2 requests information about the mobile client to HA. Let the time taken be T(FA2-HA). The HA replies with the information about mobile client to the FA2 along with the security key that needs to be used for the communication. Let the time taken be T(HA-FA2).

The FA2 acknowledges to the HA. Let the time taken be T(FA2i-HA). The registration and exchange of keys occurs between the FA2 and the mobile client. Let the time taken be

$$X = T(MN-FA) + T(FA-MN) + T(MN2-FA). \quad (4)$$

Next, the FA2 requests the FA1 to delete the entry for the mobile client and perform layer 2 handoff. Let the layer 2 handoff delay be TR. Hence Total handoff time (layer 3) before nth movement and after (n+1)th movement using proposed architecture is

$$\text{Total Time} = T_{\text{Lifetime}} + Td1 + Ti1 + T(FA2-HA) + T(HA-FA2) + T(FA2i-HA) + X + L2\text{delay} + TR \quad (4)$$

Comparing the four approaches described here, it can be said that, while the proposed architecture introduces additional protocol overhead, it provides highest security for the communication between the mobile clients and the mobility agents. With the pre-registration process in place, the actual handoff delay will be just the layer 2 handoff delay (similar to basic WSN based handoff approach).

Hence, the performance impact would be negligible as compared to other approaches. Since the security associations are established during the layer 3 handoff process the communication between the mobile client and the mobility agents will always be secure. While, in this paper, the authors have not discussed the security associations between HA and FA, that is another aspect that could be considered for further enhancements.

**5. Drawbacks:** As per the proposed architecture, the mobile client will send additional packets periodically updating the HA with the new security key. This will add additional overhead. Another drawback of the proposed architecture is the memory requirements. As the number of mobile clients supported by a home agent increases, the memory required to hold the security keys will also increase.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, the authors have proposed novel security architecture to secure the communication between the mobile client and the mobility agents. The proposed architecture is designed to be light weight and has minimal impact on the performance of the mobile clients. Through analysis, the authors have proved that, with minimal cost, the proposed architecture provides better security compared to other similar approaches. As part of the future work, the authors are looking at the ways to implement the proposed architecture and test its working. The authors are also looking into the security of communication between the mobility agents as that is one of the weak links in the current.

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